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Abstract
The highly task-specific fixation patterns revealed in performance of natural tasks demonstrate the fundamentally active nature
of vision, and suggest that in many situations, top-down processes may be a major factor in the acquisition of visual information.
Understanding how a top-down visual system could function requires understanding the mechanisms that control the initiation
of the different task-specific computations at the appropriate time. This is particularly difficult in dynamic environments, like
driving, where many aspects of the visual input may be unpredictable. We therefore examined drivers’ abilities to detect Stop signs
in a virtual environment when the signs were visible for restricted periods of time. Detection performance is heavily modulated
both by the instructions and the local visual context. This suggests that visibility of the signs requires active search, and that the
frequency of this search is influenced by learnt knowledge of the probabilistic structure of the environment. © 2001 Elsevier




In everyday life, visual operations are embedded in
the context of ongoing behavior, and depend critically
on this immediate context. We have little understand-
ing, however, of how visual processes evolve in time in
the context of extended behavioral sequences. Investi-
gation of vision in the natural world has revealed that
the pattern and duration of the fixations are highly
specialized for each situation. In driving, Land has
shown that drivers reliably fixate the tangent point of
the curve to control steering around the curve (Land &
Lee, 1994). In cricket, players exhibit very precise fixa-
tion patterns, fixating the bounce point of the ball just
ahead of its impact (Land & McCleod, 2000). A similar
pattern is seen in table tennis (Land & Furneaux, 1997).
Ballard, Hayhoe, and Pelz (1995) found stereotyped
fixation patterns in a block-copying task. In tea making
(Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999) and sandwich making
(Hayhoe, Land, & Shrivastava, 1999) observers’ fixa-
tions are tightly linked, step-by-step, with task perfor-
mance. The duration of the fixations is also different
for different tasks. Epelboim et al. (1995) showed dif-
ferent fixation durations for tapping and looking at a
set of points on a table. In all these cases, the visual
stimulus is similar throughout the task, but the observ-
er’s goals are different. Observers actively select the
specific information required for the momentary cogni-
tive goal. What are the mechanisms that orchestrate the
selection process?
Selection of just the task-specific information from a
scene is an efficient strategy. It is not possible to
anticipate and compute all the information in a scene
that might be needed ahead of time (Ullman, 1984).
Some kind of selection is necessary to deal with the
computational complexity of representing even simple
properties of objects and scenes (Bajcsy, 1988; Brooks,
1986; Ballard, 1991). Task-specific strategies not only
circumscribe the information that needs to be acquired,
but also allow the visual system to take advantage of
the known context to simplify the computation (Ballard
et al., 1997) However, this computational advantage
comes at a cost. Any task-driven, or top-down system
must deal with the issue of how the particular computa-
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: hshinoda@se.ritsumei.ac.jp (H. Shinoda),
mary@cvs.rochester.edu (M.M. Hayhoe).
1 Present address: Department of Photonics, Ritsumeikan Univer-
sity, Kusatsu Shiga 525-8577, Japan.
0042-6989/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0042-6989(01)00199-7
H. Shinoda et al. / Vision Research 41 (2001) 3535–35453536
tions are scheduled. There must be some mechanism for
providing the observer with perceptual information that
is not on the current agenda. The visual system must
balance the selectivity of ongoing task specific compu-
tations against the need to remain responsive to novel
and unpredictable visual input that may change the
task agenda. How do we select what we need to see
without knowing what is there in the first place? This
problem is particularly challenging in dynamic environ-
ments. In the context of driving, for example, it is
usually not known ahead of time where the traffic signs
are located, or when the car in front might turn. This
issue has been described by Ullman (1984) as the ‘initial
access’ problem. We refer to it here and elsewhere
(Hayhoe, 2000) as the ‘scheduling’ problem.
How do observers switch from one behavior to an-
other? What determines when an observer will attend to
a traffic sign instead of the car in front? The traditional
solution to this problem has been to assume that some
ongoing ‘pre-attentive’ analysis of the visual image
takes place, and that the products of this analysis
attract the observer’s attention to important aspects of
the image for further processing (Neisser, 1967; Treis-
man, 1993; Wolfe, 1994, 1999; Itti & Koch, 2000).
Temporal transients, for example, are perceptually
salient and typically attract attention (Yantis, 1998). In
this view, basic visual responses are driven ‘bottom-up’
by the image and serve as a basis for more extensive
processing. However, the extent and effectiveness of
bottom-up vision are unclear. A number of studies have
shown that the ability of even stimuli such as a unique
color or abrupt onset to attract attention is modulated
by the current attentional set (Yantis, 1998). For exam-
ple, Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) showed that
a color singleton attracted attention during visual
search for a colored object, but not during a search for
an abrupt onset stimulus. They proposed that subjects
adopt an ‘attentional control setting’ that determines
which features will control the deployment of attention
in any given task. This may be a way to benefit from
the advantages of attentional selection while solving the
scheduling or initial access problem. There is still uncer-
tainty, however, whether some stimuli such as onsets or
novel objects invariably attract attention whatever the
task (Gibson & Yiang, 1998; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998;
Yantis, 1998; Turatto & Galfano, 2000).
Since the ability of particular stimuli to attract atten-
tion is very sensitive to the conditions of the experi-
ment, it is difficult to predict how feature-driven
attention might generalize to the natural world. Retinal
transients cannot be relied on to attract attention, since
transients are continuously generated across the entire
visual field as a result of the observer’s own move-
ments. In ordinary life, the visual system needs to deal
with the entire visual field, which presents a complex
unsegmented spatial array. In contrast, typical experi-
mental displays subtend only a small portion of the
visual field, and the stimuli are usually simple, easily
segmented, geometric forms. Another important factor
is time. The temporal evolution of behavior in natural
environments occurs over seconds to minutes, and is
hard to address in standard experimental paradigms.
The issue of scheduling, or how behaviors are initiated,
can only be addressed indirectly, since the observer’s
task is defined by the experimenter, and remains con-
stant within blocks of trials. Nor is it always clear how
observers define the task. Thus, the whole area of the
display might be accorded some attention as potentially
relevant in the experiment. Gibson and Kelsey (1998)
and Mack and Rock (1998) show that observers change
their attentional set in response to an unexpected event
on a single trial.
Studies of the ability of pre-attentive mechanisms to
control the agenda typically look for interference effects
from unattended stimuli while subjects are engaged in
another task. The present study takes a different ap-
proach, and asks to what extent top-down mechanisms
can handle the demands of normal vision. This can be
done by exploiting advances in rendering to create
virtual environments that can be updated at a rate that
creates a realistic impression of the natural world. In
such environments, arbitrary changes can be introduced
to manipulate the availability of task-relevant informa-
tion at critical points in the ongoing behavioral se-
quence, while maintaining the continuity of the input
from the visual world. By manipulating the temporal
location of task-specific information, we can assess the
observer’s strategies for obtaining it.
Is feature-driven analysis needed to handle the unpre-
dictability of the natural world? In order to address
this, we used a driving task, where the observer must
select information necessary for task performance at
the appropriate time, from a complex and constantly
changing image. Driving has an obvious ongoing visual
agenda. There are a number of tasks that require
different information from the image: steering, avoiding
obstacles, detecting traffic signals and braking, observ-
ing the layout of the surroundings etc. How is each of
these tasks initiated? In a purely top-down system, the
mere presence of a stimulus such as a Stop sign will not
be enough to ensure detection if it does not coincide
with an episode where the observer is actively searching
for signs. If the stimulus itself attracts attention, how-
ever, it should be detected whenever it is presented.
Thus, the logic of the experiment was to examine the
visibility of Stop signs, which can be detected on the
basis of a simple color feature, when the signs are
present only for brief periods during the driving se-
quence. One way that observers might handle environ-
mental uncertainty in a top-down system is by using
learnt knowledge of the probabilistic structure of the
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environment to initiate task-specific computations at
likely points. Chun and Yiang (1998, 1999) showed
that visual search is facilitated by implicit learning of
spatial structure in static and dynamic environments,
and of the covariation between sets of objects. To
examine whether this is a factor in normal viewing,
we manipulated the a priori likelihood of the stimulus
and observe the extent to which this modulates the
probability of responding to the sign. In addition to
this, we manipulated the subject’s overall goals. If
observers rely on bottom-up scene analysis to initiate
a particular visual computation, these manipulations
should have little effect. However, subjects’ behavior
should be sensitive to these manipulations to the ex-
tent that it is controlled by top-down factors.
Another difficult issue is determining exactly when
the Stop sign is visible to the observer. Conscious
report is likely to be an incomplete measure of visual
processing, since it necessarily reflects only what the
observer remembers, and not the instantaneous pro-
cessing (Wolfe, 1999). In addition, Hayhoe et al.
(1999) showed that fixation durations revealed a sen-
sitivity to stimulus changes that could not be reported
verbally. Since the fixation locus and focus of atten-
tion are tightly linked, eye movements are likely to be
a more sensitive measure of the observers’ attentional
state. This too, is an incomplete measure, as subjects
can easily distribute their attention covertly across the
visual field in the absence of eye movements (Engel,
1971; Saarinen & Julesz, 1991; Summala, Nieminen,
& Punto, 1996), and some kinds of information, like
optic flow, require information from the entire visual
field. However, a variety of psychophysical and imag-
ing studies support the idea that the shifts in atten-
tion made by the observer are usually reflected in the
fixations. Corbetta (1998) and Culham et al. (1998)
have demonstrated that the regions in posterior pari-
etal and frontal cortex activated in fMRI studies of
overt and covert attention are almost identical. Mot-
ter and Belky (1998) and Findlay and Gilchrist (1998)
have also argued that fixations reflect attentional dis-
tribution in visual search experiments. The tight link
between fixations and task performance in natural sit-
uations, as described above, also lends credence to
the idea that fixations reflect the primary distribution
of attention. However, because of the difficulty in
equating fixations and attentional state, we also mea-
sured the drivers’ braking behavior. Thus, if a driver
detects a Stop sign in the peripheral retina without
fixating it, this may be revealed by braking to stop at
the sign. All three measures, eye movements, stop-
ping, and verbal report, were used in the experiment,
since they all provide evidence that the sign was visi-
ble to the subject in some way.
2. Methods
2.1. Driing simulator and eye tracker
The driving simulator was based on a go-kart
frame in which a steering wheel, a gas pedal, and a
brake pedal were instrumented with potentiometers.
The graphic system, a Silicon Graphics Onyx proces-
sor equipped with four R10,000 processors and an
Infinite Realty rendering engine, generated a pair of
stereo images at up to 60 Hz. Stereo images were
presented through a Virtual Research V8 head-
mounted display (HMD). The V8 HMD had a pair
of 1.3 inch (3.3 cm) LCD panels with a resolution of
640×480, which offered a visual field of 60°×45°.
The actual field of view in the helmet was 54°. The
position and orientation of the subject’s head was
measured by the Polhemus Fastrak 3-SPACE motion
tracking system that updated the image at frame rates
(typically about 30 Hz). The subject’s left eye was
tracked by an ASL Model 501 eyetracker mounted in
the V8 HMD. Data were in the form of a video
record of the image presented to the subjects, with
gaze direction indicated by a white cursor. Car dis-
tance, speed of the subject’s car, and their behavioral
data such as steering, gas, and brake were stored in
the Graphics computer. For one subject, eye position
data were collected in the data stream, in addition to
the video record.
2.2. Virtual enironment
The virtual town, a Silicon Graphics ‘Performer
Town’, consisted of irregularly sized city blocks and
extended over 600×400 m2. The texture mapping
and wide variety of buildings and objects gave the
town a realistic appearance. There were no pedestri-
ans and no vehicles, except the lead car during the
experiment.
2.3. Procedure
Fourteen paid volunteers participated in the experi-
ment. All the subjects had normal color vision, nor-
mal visual acuity without glasses, and abundant
driving experience. They were all naı¨ve about the ex-
periment. All subjects were given a practice trial at
the beginning of the experiment to get used to the
virtual environment. To control their path through
the town and to provide an attentional load, we
asked subjects to try to keep a constant distance be-
hind a lead vehicle. In one particular block, a No
Parking sign was replaced by a Stop sign for a 0.5–
1.0 s period. The sequence of events is shown in Fig.
1. A uniform white frame (130 ms) was inserted prior
to the transition to mask retinal transient generated
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Fig. 1. Sign alternation sequence. A No Parking sign was replaced by a Stop sign for 0.5–1.0 s while the subject was in a predefined region, which
was set at either 60–50 m or 40–30 m before the sign. The sign alternation occurred either at an intersection or in the middle of the block. An
80 ms white blank screen was interposed at the moment of sign change, to mask local retinal transients that might draw subjects’ attention to the
sign. This enabled us to analyze the effect of the presence of a Stop sign itself, rather than a retinal transient. The lead car (L) cruised along a
predefined path. The lead car’s speed was sinusoidally modulated around 13 m/s with an amplitude of 2 m/s at a frequency of 0.25 Hz so that
it engaged the subjects’ attention for a substantial fraction of the time.
by the change. This technique has been used in a variety
of change blindness experiments (Rensink, O’Regan, &
Clark, 1997; O’Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000).
Similar white frames were inserted at random points
during the experiment, so that subjects would not asso-
ciate the occurrence of the blank with a sign change.
To manipulate the behavioral relevance of the signs,
subjects were asked either to follow a lead car, keeping
a constant distance behind it (F task), or to observe
normal traffic rules in addition to following (F+S task).
In each of these tasks, no other instructions were given.
In the F+S task, no mention was made of stop signs.
Each subject drove through the town four times; the first
two trials were for the F task, and the last two trials were
for the F+S task. This order was used because it seemed
likely that the F+S instruction might influence behavior
in the F condition if it followed the F+S instruction. The
temporary Stop sign appeared at a distance of 60–50 m
in the first and the third trial, and at a closer distance
(40–30 m) in the second and fourth trial. We did not
know ahead of time the point at which subjects might
look for signs preparatory to stopping. These two
distances were chosen to span the range of likely dis-
tances. At these distances, the sign was between 7° and
14° eccentricity, and the sign subtended from 0.8° to 1.8°.
For each of the distances, a different route was used, one
for trials 1 and 3, the other for trials 2 and 4.
To test whether subjects make use of learned probabil-
ities about the environment to control visual sensitivity,
we manipulated the location of the sign. For half of
subjects, the sign was at an intersection. For the other
half, it was in a less likely location in the middle of a
block. (Thus the location factor involved independent
groups, whereas the instruction manipulation involved
repeated measures on the same subjects.) Image parame-
ters of Stop sign, such as size, eccentricity, and duration,
were identical regardless of its location (intersection or
mid-block). On each trial, there was only one critical
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Fig. 2. Proportion of time gaze location was on the road (ROAD), the car in front (CAR), the side of the road (SIDE), the region of the
intersection (INT) or the background (BACK). Data are shown for each of the four trials for Mid-Block and Intersection groups, each averaged
over seven subjects. Standard errors are given in the text. The data are for the block in which the sign change occurred up to the point when the
driver was 30 m from the intersection. (After that point, the details of the fixations are governed by the details of the intersection and by the
observer’s decision to stop.)
block where the sign alternation occurred. As well as
monitoring gaze and braking performance, the subjects
were asked at the end of the experiment if they noticed
anything unusual. If they did not report the sign change,
they were then asked about it explicitly. As discussed
above, each of these measures was taken as evidence of
visibility, that is, reporting the sign alternation (percep-
tual criterion), stopping at the sign (behavioral criterion,)
or making a saccade to the sign (eye-movement crite-
rion).
3. Results
The video records of gaze, superimposed on the image
sequence, were used to classify gaze location into five
categories, as shown in Fig. 2. In the critical block where
the sign change occurred, gaze was classified as either on
the car in front, on the road, on the side of the road to
the right where signs might be present, in the region of
the intersection, or on the background (buildings, sky,
etc.). The proportion of the time that gaze is in each of
these categories is shown for each trial for both groups.
This figure shows the effect of the instructions on the
distribution of gaze. When subjects are asked to follow
normal traffic rules, they spend much more time looking
in the neighborhood of the intersection than when asked
only to follow. This is true for both trials for Intersection
and Mid-block groups. Averaging over trials and groups
gives a value of 45% of the time in the F+S condition
(S.E.M. between subjects=5%) as opposed to 15%
(S.E.M. between subjects=3.8%) in the F condition.
Similarly, the time spent fixating the side of the road went
from less than 1% (S.E.M.=0.5%) to 6% (S.E.M.=
1.6%). All subjects except one showed this pattern, and
the between-subject variability is quite small. This pat-
tern is unaffected by the condition (Mid-block versus
Intersection) and does not change between the first and
second trials for the same instruction. This shows that
subjects deploy systematically different gaze patterns
depending on their overall goal.
Fig. 3 shows three examples from the video record to
show how subjects distribute their gaze over a 15 s time
interval. In Fig. 3a, the sign was presented mid-block,
and the instruction was to follow the lead car (F task).
In this case, the subject made no fixations on the roadside
area in the neighborhood of the sign and did not brake
at any point on the block. Gaze was largely confined to
the car ahead or to the roadway. In the subsequent
questioning, the subject did not report seeing the sign
alternation. Thus, we categorize this as a failure to detect
the sign. In contrast, in Fig. 3b, the subject fixated the
Stop sign during the presentation period. The sign al-
ternation was also reported subsequently. Thus, the sign
was detected on this trial. In this condition, the sign was
presented mid-block in the F+S task. The influence of
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Fig. 3. Gaze sequences in the block where the sign alternation occurred. All fixations were categorized according to their locations (road, car,
roadside, intersection, or background) using the video record, and shown by thick horizontal lines. Note that each line does not necessarily
correspond to a single fixation, but indicates only that gaze fell in the categorized area. Shaded areas show the period when the Stop sign was
being presented. Horizontal dotted lines indicate the location of the Stop sign. The thick line on the bottom indicates the period when the subject
Stopped. (a) Subject KA, F task, mid-block (60–50 m). Gaze was directed onto CAR or ROAD for most of the time, and no fixation was made
on the sign on the roadside. (b) Same subject for the F+S task, mid-block (40–30 m). The subject made saccade to the Stop sign at 135.5 s. A
thick line on the bottom shows the subject Stopped at the intersection. (c) Subject LC, F+S task, intersection (60–50 m). The subject saw the
Stop sign during the presentation period and Stopped at the intersection. She did not make re-fixation at the sign (No Parking sign) and did not
report seeing the sign alternation.
the instructions on gaze distribution is evident in these
two trials. Fig. 3c shows the gaze sequence for another
subject in the F+S task. Here, the Stop sign was at the
intersection (shown by the dotted line). The subject
fixated the sign and stopped a few seconds later (indi-
cated by the thick line at the bottom of the figure). At
this point, the subject’s gaze was directed at the Stop
line on the road. Interestingly, after seeing the sign, the
subject did not re-fixate it, even though it had turned
back to a No Parking sign. Nor was she aware of the
alternation. This suggests that once the decision to stop
was made, that region of the visual field was not
analyzed further.
Fig. 4 shows an example trial in one subject for
whom gaze location was available in the data record.
These records show the metrical gaze position informa-
tion in addition to gaze category. (The data from this
subject are not included in Fig. 2 or Fig. 5, as they were
obtained after the main body of the experiment. They
are included here to give an indication of the relative
locations of the relevant stimuli in the visual field as the
subject approaches an intersection.) Horizontal gaze is
plotted as a function of time, together with the position
of the lead car and two Stop signs, one mid-block and
one at the intersection. The mid-block sign was a No
Parking sign except for the period indicated on the
figure, where it became a Stop sign. For most of the
period, the subject’s gaze is fixed of the lead car. In this
trial, the subject fixates the mid-block sign during the
period when it is a Stop sign, and then fixates the
permanent Stop sign at the intersection several seconds
later. In both cases, the sign is at a retinal eccentricity
of about 10°, and the sign itself subtends about 1.3°. At
the end of the trace, gaze is transferred to the road in
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Fig. 4. Horizontal gaze location for one subject whose gaze coordinates were recorded in addition to the video record. The figure shows the
trajectory of the No Parking sign across the visual field in the mid-block condition. The vertical lines indicate the period when it was a Stop sign.
The trajectories of the (permanent) sign at the intersection and the lead car are also shown. Gaze is shown by the solid line.
Fig. 5. Detection probability for both sign locations (mid-block, intersection) and both tasks (F, F+S). The two trials for the F and F+S
conditions, corresponding to the different distances, are also shown. Detection includes either noticing the sign alternation (perceptual criterion),
Stopping at the sign (behavioral criterion) or making a saccadic eye movement to the sign (eye-movement criterion). Probability of awareness of
the alternation was obtained for the perceptual criterion only.
the region of the intersection, in preparation for stop-
ping. Note that in this instance, the subject fixates the
real sign at about the same distance as the temporary
sign, suggesting that the locations chosen in the experi-
ment (40–50 m and 50–60 m) are probably reasonable.
Analysis of the point at which subjects first fixated close
to the permanent stop signs (in the region of the
intersection) varied widely across subjects and across
trials for the same subject. This suggests that the choice
of distances in the experiment is not critical.
Fig. 5 shows the probability of detection over all the
subjects in the four trials, for both Mid-Block and
Intersection conditions. To calculate the probability of
detection shown in the figure, we used only those trials
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up to, and including, the first detection, since detection
on one trial may influence the probability of detection
on subsequent trials. This partially removes contamina-
tion from possible order effects. Probability of detec-
tion is shown both for the perceptual awareness
criterion alone, and for the combination of all the
measures. The combined measure is dominated by the
eye movements. When subjects look at the sign, they
are frequently unaware of the sign alternation. Subjects
reported the sign alternation without fixating the sign
on only two occasions (of 56 possible occasions, and 16
instances when the alternation was reported). This sug-
gests that an attentional shift to the peripheral retina in
the region of the sign is almost always accompanied by
an overt gaze change. On one of these two occasions,
the subject stopped at the intersection. This was the
only time a subject stopped without a prior fixation on
the sign. Thus, fixation is the most sensitive measure of
detection in this context. Fixation was usually accom-
panied by stopping when the sign was at the intersec-
tion, but subjects never stopped for the Mid-block sign.
Detection probability is heavily modulated both by
task relevance and by the environmental context of the
stimulus. The sign was rarely detected in the F task,
regardless of its location (0.15 in mid-block, 0.08 at the
intersection, averaged over the two trials). In the F+S
task, subjects are much more likely to detect the sign. It
was detected with probability 0.33 at mid-block (aver-
aged over trials 1 and 2), and in all trials at the
intersection (probability 1.0).2 Because the four trials
were done in a fixed sequence, it is possible that the
effect of instructions is contaminated by order effects.
However, there is little difference between the first and
second trials, except for the Mid-Block, F+S condi-
tion, suggesting that order effects are modest. In addi-
tion, only the first detection was used, as described
above. No order effects between trials one and two
were present in the gaze distributions shown in Fig. 2.
There is also an effect of sign location in the F+S
condition. When the Stop sign is in the Mid-Block, it
will not be detected on about 2/3 of the occasions. This
suggests that subjects are more likely to actively search
the peripheral visual field for a sign in a context where
it has high probability. This is consistent with the
greater time spent fixating in the neighborhood of
intersections than along the side of the road, shown in
Fig. 2. The number of fixations does not reveal the
frequency of covert search, however, as some searches
may not result in an eye movement. The low probabil-
ity of detection in the F task also suggests that detect-
ing the sign requires an active search, and this is
unlikely to be performed when it is not needed. The
smaller number of overt fixations on the intersection
shown in Fig. 2 is also consistent with this. Subjects in
this condition were not told to ignore the traffic signs,
but this seemed to be the subjects’ default assumption.
It might be argued that the low detection probability
results from the relatively small size of the Stop sign, or
relatively low contrast with respect to its surroundings.
However, the fact that it was invariably detected when
at an intersection, even for a brief period, argues
against this. Thus, perception appears to depend heav-
ily on active search initiated by the observer, based on
learnt probabilities.
4. Discussion
These results suggest that a top-down system can
handle many of the scheduling demands of detecting
signs when subjects are attempting to follow normal
traffic rules, and the environment is predictable. Sub-
jects reliably fixated the sign at the intersection, even
though it was presented for a restricted period. Al-
though the sign was detected in mid-block only a third
of the time, the likelihood of detection would no doubt
be greater if the sign were present continuously. The
reduced likelihood of fixating the sign in mid-block
shows that observers rely on learnt regularities in the
environment to control the scheduling of their searches.
Consistent with this, overt fixations in the intersection
were much more frequent than fixations by the side of
the road (45% versus 6%) when subjects were obeying
traffic rules. This reliance on learnt scene regularities is
consistent with the results of Chun and Yiang (1998,
1999), that familiar contexts facilitate visual search. It is
hard to evaluate the magnitude of the bottom up
component, as subjects might detect the sign covertly in
the F condition, but give it less behavioral significance,
and fail to respond either by fixating it, stopping, or by
being consciously aware of it. However, the greater
sensitivity of the gaze measure than perceptual aware-
ness supports the idea that overt gaze location specifies
the primary distribution of attention, as discussed
above. Perhaps more importantly, subjects spend nearly
half of the time deploying gaze in the region of the
intersection, when required to drive normally. This
suggests that an active search is necessary, and that
bottom up mechanisms cannot be relied on to attract
attention, at least in the case of Stop signs. Stimuli that
are larger or higher contrast, such as other cars, would
no doubt have a greater intrinsic salience.
2 In order to evaluate the reliability of these differences, it is
necessary to assume binomial variability, which ranges between 0.1
and 0.17 for this small number of subjects. On this assumption, the
effect of instructions in the Intersection condition, and location in the
F+S condition are reliable, but the effect of instructions in the
mid-block condition is too small to be statistically reliable. A larger
sample is needed to get a reliable estimate of the Mid-Block, F+S
probability.
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The current experiment is consistent with the idea
that the complex task of driving might be decomposed
into sequential application of simple routines for the
various sub-tasks, such as route following, obstacle
avoidance, speed control, and detection of traffic signs.
Salgian and Ballard, (1998) designed an automated
vehicle based on this principle that ran on the same
complex images viewed by subjects in this experiment.
The vehicle had a hierarchical organization, with spe-
cialized behaviors for stopping at traffic lights and Stop
signs, and car following. These behaviors used a sub-set
of specialized routines, which in turn used sets of basic
operations on the image such as spatial frequency and
chromatic analysis. The routine for Stop sign detection
involved examining a restricted region of the visual
image (on the right) looking for red blobs, and, if one
is found, examining the spatial frequency content for a
match to Stop sign image. The vehicle was able to
analyze complex images in real time and detect traffic
signs and follow another vehicle. Observers’ behavior in
the current experiment can be well described by such a
model. In Salgian and Ballard’s model, however, the
issue of scheduling was not addressed. Their vehicle
simply cycled through the behaviors at a fixed rate. It
appears, however, that human observers take advan-
tage of prior experience. The finding that subjects are
more likely to search in the region of intersections
suggests that the probability of deployment of a partic-
ular routine at a given point in the task must depend on
learnt schemas. Similar evidence for control of informa-
tion acquisition by learnt schemas in several everyday
tasks is demonstrated by Land and colleagues (Land &
Furneaux, 1997; Land & McCleod, 2000). In cricket,
for example, observers fixate the ball for about 100 ms
as it leaves the batsman’s hands, saccade to the antici-
pated bounce point of the ball, and use the trajectory
information to modulate the swing of the bat. Chap-
man and Underwood (1998) also demonstrated differ-
ent eye movement patterns in expert and novice drivers.
While such stereotyped patterns are not surprising for
skilled behavior, it may be the case that similar princi-
ples pertain to general settings.
How does the context of the intersection facilitate
detection of the sign? There are three ways that this
might occur. One is that drivers actively search for
intersections, and then schedule searches for Stop signs
at a higher rate when one is found. Drivers in this
experiment frequently look to the end of the street
upon turning a corner, consistent with this strategy.
The greater frequency of overt fixations in the intersec-
tion than on the side of the road is also evidence for
more frequent searches. Another possibility is that
when the observer fixates the intersection, the eccentric-
ity of the sign is reduced, and this facilitates detection.
On three of 14 trials, the observer was fixating the No
Parking sign at the point when it changed to a Stop
sign, so this factor must play some role. A third possi-
bility is that the familiar visual configuration of the
intersection facilitates detection or recognition of the
sign. There is considerable evidence for this kind of
facilitation (e.g. Biderman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz,
1982; De Graef, 1992), although it is not clear whether
semantic content or basic featural properties of a scene
guide attention to peripheral locations (De Graef, 1998;
Henderson & Hollingworth, 1998). The present data do
not allow us to discriminate between these possibilities.
The current experiment is similar to a number of
experiments on the phenomenon of ‘change blindness’,
where observers are insensitive to many changes made
in scenes either during a saccadic eye movement or
some other masking stimulus. (See Simons, 2000 for a
comprehensive review.) Perhaps the most similar exper-
iments are those of Simons and Levin (1997), who
demonstrated such change blindness when observers
watched film clips or were involved in a conversation in
the real world. The current experiment provides a uni-
fying principle for understanding what changes are
noticed by observers. Sensitivity to changes has been
related to areas rated as having ‘central interest’ in
pictures of scenes (Rensink et al., 1997; O’Regan,
Rensink, & Clark, 1999). However, attentional state in
the change blindness experiments is typically not con-
trolled, so it is hard to make a definitive link. The
current experiments show that sensitivity is directly
related to the particular information that observers
extract from a scene, and to the precise time when it is
extracted. This is supported by the findings of Wallis
and Bulthoff (2000). In a similar driving simulator, they
found less sensitivity to changes for drivers than pas-
sengers exposed to the identical image sequence. It is
also consistent with the findings of Henderson and
Hollingworth (1999), who showed that subjects are
more likely to notice a change in a target made during
a saccade to the object than during a saccade away
from the object. It also explains O’Regan et al.’s (2000)
finding that even objects near fixation can undergo a
change without the subjects’ awareness. This might
occur if the particular information being extracted dif-
fered from that which was changed. O’Regan et al.
offer a similar explanation. Simons (2000) points out
that there is evidence to support a variety of different
accounts of change blindness: subjects might represent
information in the initial view before the change, or in
the final view, or represent both but fail to compare
them. These hypotheses are not exclusive, however,
since each of these possibilities can be seen as a mani-
festation of the active and highly specialized nature of
visual computations. Thus, in Henderson and Holling-
worth’s (1999) experiment, for example, attention is
focussed on the target region before a saccade (Kowler,
Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995; Gottlieb, Kusunoki,
& Goldberg, 1998; McPeek, Maljkovic, & Nakayama,
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1999), making it likely that a change will be noticed
during the subsequent fixation.
The experiments also discriminate between the possi-
bility that the studies of change blindness really test only
what is remembered from prior views, not what might be
processed while the image is on the retina (Wolfe, 1999).
Rapid decay of information in memory certainly must
lead us to underestimate the information represented
within a fixation. In the present experiment, subjects were
not asked to detect changes, an arguably rather unnatu-
ral task, but only asked this subsequent to the experi-
ment. By using fixation patterns, the experiment tests
more directly what information is accessible while the
image is present. Since the Stop sign is relevant to the
task, one would expect it to attract attention when it is
present in the image, if there is some bottom-up analysis
of that information. Instead, subjects rarely fixate the
sign or apply the brakes unless it is at an intersection,
and they are explicitly following traffic rules. Similarly,
the change from a Stop sign to No Parking sign at the
intersection was unlikely to be noticed after a subject’s
gaze returned to the road, even though that location had
recently been attended. Instead, once the decision to Stop
had been made, information in that location was no
longer relevant to the task. This is consistent with the
prediction of O’Regan et al. (2000), that changes in parts
of a scene already encoded would not be noticed. Thus,
our results strengthen the claim that representations
within a fixation are restricted (Irwin, 1991; Rensink et
al., 1997; O’Regan et al., 1999; Mack & Rock, 1998;
Simons, 2000) and are not simply consequence of limited
memory. Further examination of other information in
the scene is necessary before this can be concluded with
any confidence, however.
In summary, the present study suggests that observers
manage some of the demands of scheduling behaviors in
a normal driving environment on the basis of top-down
mechanisms. Bottom-up responses appear to be limited
in this context. Instead, visibility of traffic signs depends
on active search according to an internally generated
schedule, and this schedule depends both on the observ-
er’s goals and on learnt probabilities about the environ-
ment. We propose that vision involves the dynamic
application of specialized routines initiated by the ob-
server, whose current goals specify the information that
is extracted from a scene and the time it is extracted.
Thus, a fuller understanding of the mechanisms of
attention, and how attention is distributed in a scene,
needs to be situated in the observer’s natural behavior.
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